Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas by Gürerk, Özgür
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Social learning increases the acceptance
and the efficiency of punishment
institutions in social dilemmas
O¨zgu¨r Gu¨rerk
University of Erfurt, CEREB
November 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42971/
MPRA Paper No. 42971, posted 1. December 2012 02:14 UTC
Social learning increases the acceptance and the
efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas
O¨zgu¨r Gu¨rerk
November 2010
University of Erfurt, Nordha¨user Str. 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany
Abstract
Endogenously chosen punishment institutions perform well in increasing con-
tributions and long-term payoffs in social dilemma situations. However, they
suffer from (a) initial reluctance of subjects to join the punishment institu-
tion and (b) initial efficiency losses due to frequent punishment. Here, we
investigate the effects of social learning on the acceptence and the efficieny of
a peer punishment institution in a community choice experiment. Subjects
choose between communities with and without the possibility to punish peers
before interacting in a repeated social dilemma situation. We find that pro-
viding participants with a social history - presenting the main results of an
identical previous experiment conducted with different subjects - decreases
the initial reluctance towards the punishment institution significantly. More-
over, with social history, cooperative groups reach the social optimum more
rapidly and there is lower efficiency loss due to reduced punishment. Our
findings shed light on the importance of social learning for the acceptance of
seemingly unpopular but socially desirable mechanisms.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier December 8, 2010
JEL classification: C92; H41
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1. Introduction
For communities with an exogenously fixed composition of members, ex-
perimental studies identify decentralized (peer) punishment mechanism as
a valuable means to sustain cooperation in social dilemmas (see e.g., Os-
trom et al., 1992; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). While peer punishment suc-
ceeds to increase contributions in experiments, it also causes an efficiency
loss due to high punishment acts, especially in the beginning phase of the
play. As a consequence, peer punishment institutions do not produce sig-
nificantly higher payoffs compared to standard voluntary contribution mech-
anism (VCM) without the punishment option (cf. Egas and Riedl, 2008).
This observation seems to be valid not only for the “standard western” sub-
ject pools. Herrmann et al. (2008) show in a cross cultural study that in the
majority of experiments punishment do not increase the payoffs significantly
when it is compared to standard VCM.
The efficiency losses, however, are not independent of the institutional
framework and parameters. Ga¨chter et al. (2008) show that extending the
experimental time horizon may improve the overall efficiency of the peer-
punishment mechanism. If a public goods experiment with punishment
stage is played over 50 periods it produces significantly higher payoffs than
the VCM. Nevertheless, also in this study there still remains a considerable
amount of initial efficiency loss. Thus, it takes time for the punishment
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institution to unfold its full impact on payoffs.
Another strand of recent studies focus show that endogenous choice of
punishment institutions may also help to improve contributions and its over-
all efficiency (e.g., Sutter et al., 2010; Gu¨rerk et al., 2006, 2010). Sutter et al.
(2010) investigate the effects of institution choice by voting between standard
public goods, public goods with rewards, or public goods with punishment.
Under unanimous voting, the punishment institution is rarely chosen. When
it is selected, however, it is the most successful institution in eliciting high
contributions. In Gu¨rerk et al. (2010), in each of the 30 experimental peri-
ods, subjects freely and individually choose between communities with and
without punishment possibilities before interacting with others who choose
the same institution in a social dilemma situation. This simple voting with
feet mechanism has great impact on contributions. Towards the end of the
experiment, contributions in the punishment institution converge to almost
100%, and virtually no punishment is needed. As a consequence, in the
second half of the experiment, the efficiency of the punishment institution
is significantly higher than the efficiency of the non-punishment institution.
Despite this final success of the punishment institution, there remain two
problems. First, although more than 90% of subjects opt for the punishment
institution in the end, initially, the great majority of subjects are reluctant
to choose the punishment community. In the first period, only one third of
the subjects opt for it.1 Second, there is still a considerable amount of initial
punishment activity that decreases efficiency in the beginning phase of the
1The reluctance against punishment institutions is also found by Sutter et al. (2010)
and Gu¨rerk et al. (2009).
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experiment and have a negative effect on the overall efficiency.
How can the initial reluctance and the initial punishment be mitigated in
order to improve the overall performance of endogenously chosen punishment
institutions? Before proposing an answer to this question let us speculate
on the reasons for the initial reluctance to choose punishment institution.
First, subjects may have a “natural aversion” against punishment since they
associate negative feelings with it. Social psychologists define negative sanc-
tions as deliberate acts that lead to unpleasant inner states that the punished
person wants to avoid. Recent experimental studies show that subjects in-
deed often prefer non-punishment communities when they have the choice
between punishment and non-punishment or reward institutions (Botelho et
al., 2007; Gu¨rerk et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010). Second, subjects may also
fear to be exposed to unjustified punishment. In fact, in experiments, pun-
ishment of high contributors is a frequently observed phenomenon (see e.g.,
Cinyabuguma et al., 2006 or Nikiforakis, 2008). Third, for subjects there may
be a rational reason to “wait” before joining a punishment community. If the
expected level of cooperation is the same in both communities then it may
be rational for subjects to join non-punishment community first (to avoid the
risk of punishment) and to wait and see how the situation in the punishment
community develops before joining in. A fourth possible explanation is that
subjects simply do not anticipate correctly that the punishment community
is the more efficient community in the long-run. If subjects knew ex-ante that
the punishment community is the superior community they would probably
join it much quickly.
In this study, we focus on the investigation of the two last proposed
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possible explanations. We contrast them by asking whether the lack of in-
formation about the high cooperation levels in the punishment institution is
a critical force that drives the reluctance to join the punishment institution.
We conjecture that endogenous choice coupled with the possibility of “so-
cial learning” may be a good way to improve the acceptance and the overall
efficiency of punishment institutions. As an experience-based information de-
vice, a social history2 may lower people’s reluctance towards the punishment
community by correcting the false expectation on its performance. To test
this we conduct a social history treatment (SHT) which is the exact replica-
tion of the PUN treatment from the study of Gu¨rerk et al. (2010). The only
difference is that in SHT, a social history, which contains the main results
of PUN, is given to the subjects. If - contrary to our conjecture - people are
rational waiters, social history should even increase the reluctance against
the punishment institution.
Our conjecture is backed by experimental work on (naive) “advice giving”
which unfolds its impact through social learning. Schotter (2003) reviews
the first studies on advice giving and finding that advice changes behavior of
the “advice takers”, i.e., subjects who have taken advice play the same game
differently than the advice givers. Chaudhuri et al. (2006) report that advice
- given as free-form text messages by individuals - increase contributions in
a public good experiment (and mitigates free-riding) if the advice is made
public and becomes common knowledge. In their influential trust game study,
Berg et al. (1995) find that a social history treatment - compared to the
2For details of the information presented in the social history see Section 2.
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baseline treatment - has significant effects on subjects’ choices. With social
history, both amounts invested by the sender and the amount sent back by
the responder increase. On the other hand, there is also some literature
reporting no change in subjects’ behavior when they are provided with a
social history (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003).
The following section describes the experimental design and procedure.
Results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. Experimental Design
The experiment is based on a social dilemma game of 30 repetitions in-
cluding three stages in each period: In Stage 0, participants in each “society”
(representing an independent observation) choose (without a cost) between a
non-punishment community (NPC) and a community with punishment pos-
sibilities (PuC). In Stage 1, each player i is endowed with 20 experimental
tokens and can anonymously invest gi ∈ 0 ≤ gi ≤ 20 in the joint project.3
The defining characteristic of a social dilemma is fulfilled independent of
the number of members nΘ with Θ ∈ 1, 2 in each community because the
marginal per capita return a is 1/nΘ < a < 1 for all nΘ with 2 ≤ nΘ ≤ N .
In PuC, Stage 1 is followed by a punishment stage. Here, all subjects are
endowed with 20 additional tokens and may anonymously assign punishment
tokens to each other (subjects in NPC also receive additional 20 tokens and
simply keep these). Each received token lowers the payoff of the punished
3If only a single player joins a community, no joint project can be created and the
endowment of the player is automatically transferred to own private account. This player
has no decision in stages 1 and 2.
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subject by three tokens. After each period, participants receive feedback
about individual contributions, received punishment tokens and payoffs in
both communities.
In SHT, the social history is handed out to subjects before the experi-
ment starts. For both communities it separately tabulates the averages of
the number of community members, contributions, payoffs, and the received
punishment tokens in PuC of the baseline treatment PUN for each period.
Additionally, the over-time evolutions of the averages are visualized in figures.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Subjects were recruited for voluntary participation via the online re-
cruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and were randomly allocated to
treatments. None of the 72 subjects had participated in a similar experi-
ment before. An experimental session lasted on average two hours. Average
earnings were 24 Euros.
3. Results
3.1. Initial community choices, contributions, punishment, and efficiency
Does social history lead to an immediate (first period) effect on subject’s
chocies and contributions?
Result 1. Social History lowers the initial reluctance to join punishment
community and increases the initial cooperation in PuC.
Social history has significant effects on subjects’ initial community choices
and contributions. First, it decreases the initial reluctance to join PuC signif-
icantly. In SHT, in period 1, 54.2% of subjects prefer PuC. This percentage
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is significantly higher (p = 0.037) than the fraction of subjects who opt for
PuC in the baseline treatment PUN (31.2%).4 Social history has also an im-
mediate effect on contributions. The fraction of high contributions (g ≥ 15)
in the punishment community of SHT (74.0%) in the first period is signifi-
cantly larger (p = 0.051) than the percentage of high contributors in PuC of
PUN (53.7%). The more cooperative decisions of subjects in PuC of SHT
results in a higher initial cooperation level. In PuC of SHT, subjects con-
tribute 78.7% of their endowment to the joint project, while in PuC of PUN
66.0% of the endowment is invested (p = 0.086).
In the first period, subjects in PuC of SHT invest less tokens (2.3) in
punishment than subjects in PuC of PUN (3.4, p = 0.138). Higher contribu-
tions and lower punishment in the first period of PuC of SHT result in higher
first period payoffs in PuC of SHT (29.2 tokens) than in PuC of PUN (26.4
tokens). This difference, however, is statistically not significant (p = 0.431).
3.2. Evolution of community choices and contributions
Does the lower initial reluctance against the punishment community and
the higher initial cooperation in PuC of SHT lead to a more accelerated
acceptance of PuC by the subjects who initially opted for NPC than observed
in PuC of PUN?
Result 2. “Full participation in PuC” is reached more rapidly and is more
stable in SHT than in PUN.
4All reported non-parametric statistical tests are two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests and
use the session averages as independent observations.
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Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the evolution of community choices. In PUN
as well as in SHT, for all but one society it is true that there is at least one
period in which all subjects of the respective society join PuC. Such a period
of “full participation in PuC” is observed much earlier in PuC of SHT (on
average in period 9.6) than in PuC of PUN (period 17.6, p = 0.033). More-
over, once established, the state of full participation is more stable in PuC of
SHT than in PuC of PUN. The average number of consecutive periods with
full participation in PuC amounts to 15.4 periods in PuC of SHT but only
to 5.6 in PuC of PUN (p = 0.027). Thus, in PuC of SHT, full cooperation
is established not only more quickly but it also lasts longer. In the very last
period, only one subject (1.4%) in SHT does not opt for PuC whereas in
PUN 8 subjects (8.4%) choose NPC.
3.3. Overall punishment behavior
Does social history change the punishment behavior? Does it affect the
frequency and the severity of punishment acts? Whether social history would
lead to less or more severe punishment than in the baseline treatment is not
clear. Social history could lead to less frequent punishment because of the
initial high cooperation level and the higher number of cooperative subjects.
It could also lead to even more frequent punishment if social history encour-
ages subjects who would not punish otherwise to imitate their predecessors’
behavior from the baseline treatment and punish.
Result 3. Overall, punishment causes fewer expenses and it is less severe in
PuC of SHT than in PuC of PUN.
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Figure 1: Average numbers
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The less contributing subjects5 in PuC of SHT receive more often pun-
ishment than their counterparts in PuC of PUN. In PuC of SHT, less-
contributors receive punishment tokens in 38.5% of all possible cases while in
PuC of PUN this is only true in 25.5% of the cases (p = 0.101). Hence, sub-
jects in PuC of SHT show less mercy against less-contributors than subjects
in PuC of SHT do. Overall, tokens sent per punishment instance, however,
is significantly lower in PuC of SHT (2.4 tokens) than in PuC of PUN (3.1)
(p = 0.043). Interestingly, in PuC of SHT, subjects with relatively high
contributions are also punished. On average, a punished subject in PuC of
SHT contributed more to the joint project than a punished subject in PuC
of PUN (17.4 versus 15.1 tokens, p = 0.022). Hence, it seems that subjects
in PuC of SHT try to establish a higher contribution norm. The frequency of
unjustified (“perverse”) punishment, i.e., the percentage of instances when
the punished person contributed equally or more than the punisher is roughly
the same in PuC of SHT (1.7%) and in PuC of PUN (1.8%). The average
severity of unjustified punishment, however, is significantly lower in PuC of
SHT (1.5 tokens per instance) than in PuC of PUN (1.9 tokens, p = 0.075).
3.4. Overall efficiency
Does social history decrease the efficiency losses? How does the efficiency
develop over the course of the experiment?
Result 4. The payoffs of the PuC catch up with the payoffs of NPC more
quickly in SHT than in PUN. Overall efficiency (over both communities) is
5With respect to subject i, less-contributors are subjects who contribute strictly less
than subject i in PuC.
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higher in SHT than in PUN.
In SHT as in PUN, in the first period, subjects in NPC obtain higher
payoffs than subjects in PuC. The initial payoffs in PuC of SHT (29.2) are
higher than the first period payoffs in PuC of PUN (26.4). As a consequence,
the initial payoff differential between NPC and PuC is lower in SHT (15.7
tokens) than in PUN (18.2 tokens). Moreover, in SHT, average earnings in
PuC catch up with the payoffs in NPC more rapidly than in PUN. In SHT,
already in fifth period, members of PuC earn more than members of NPC
(cf. Figure 1 panel d). From period five onwards, the payoffs in PuC are
constantly higher than the payoffs in NPC. In contrast, in PUN, the payoffs
in PuC oscillate strongly and catch up with the payoffs in NPC only in period
11 (cf. Figure 1 panel c). The average period where the earnings in PuC
exceed the earnings in NPC is 7.2 in SHT, while it is 15.1 in PUN (p = 0.037).
Hence, PuC becomes the more profitable community much earlier in SHT
than in PUN.
From the social planner’s perspective, one of the most interesting issues
concerns the efficiency in the society including all its communities. Figure
2 shows the overall society earnings in both treatments in three phases of
the experiment. In all phases, the payoffs in SHT are higher than in PUN.
In SHT, the average payoff of a society (over all three phases) amounts to
47.1 tokens while it is 44.5 in PUN. The surplus ratio, i.e., the actual surplus
generated by cooperative behavior in the experiment divided by the maxi-
mum possible surplus amounts to 59.2% in SHT and 37.5% in PUN. Thus,
the gains from cooperation are higher in SHT than in PUN (p = 0.101).
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Figure 2: Overall payoffs
4. Conclusion
In this study, we explore whether informed subjects are less reluctant than
uninformed subjects to join a community with a peer punishment mechanism
in a social dilemma situation and whether the society consisting of informed
subjects obtain a greater efficiency. We find a clear effect of social history on
the very first community choice. In SHT, initially, significantly more subjects
join the punishment community than in PUN. Moreover, the subjects joining
the PuC of SHT immediately start to cooperate on a much higher level
than the subjects in PuC of PUN. With social history, less-contributors are
punished more frequently but not as severe as in the baseline treatment. As
a consequence, the payoff differential that is negative for the punishment
community in the beginning, gets positive more quickly in SHT than in
PUN. As a consequence, the punishment community in SHT attracts subjects
13
more quickly than the PuC of the baseline treatment. The socially efficient
“ideal” state of “full participation” with (almost) full contributions is reached
significantly earlier in PuC of SHT than in PuC of PUN. With social history,
overall efficiency gains for the society as a whole are higher than without it.
Our findings shed light on the importance of experience-based information
for the acceptance of seemingly unpopular but socially desirable mechanisms.
In reality, often, there is resistance among citizens against reforms that are
considered efficiency-enhancing by the experts. One reason for the resistance
may be that there is a “status quo bias” when the implications of the reform
for individuals are not clear. People resist to reform if they do not know who
the gainers and who the losers will be (cf. Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991).
If the consequences of the installation of an (new) institution to solve a
social dilemma appear disadvantageous (at least to some individuals), clear
communication and explanation of the merits of the planned action in a
coherent way may help to mitigate possible frictions that possibly occur
during the transition process.
Appendix A. Instructions
Instructions for the experiment
General Information
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one
of 2 subpopulations each consisting of 12 participants. During the whole
experiment you will interact only with the members of your subpopulation.
At the beginning of the experiment, 1000 experimental tokens will be assigned
to the experimental account of each participant. Course of Action: The
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experiment consists of 30 rounds. Each round consists of 2 stages. In Stage
1, the group choice and the decision regarding the contribution to the project
take place. In Stage 2, participants may influence the earnings of the other
group members.
Stage 1
(i) The Group Choice
In Stage 1, each participant decides which group she wants to join. There
are two different groups that can be joined:
Influence on the earnings of other group members
Group A: No Group B: Yes, by assigning negative points
(ii) Contributing to the Project
In stage 1 of each round, each group member is endowed with 20 tokens.
You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you are going to contribute
to the project. The remaining tokens will be kept by yourself.
Calculation of your payoff in stage 1
Your payoff in stage 1 consists of two components:
• tokens you have kept = endowment - your contribution to the project
• earnings from the project = 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group
members / number of group members
Thus, your payoff in Stage 1 amounts to: 20 - your contribution to the
project + 1.6x sum of the contributions of all group members / number of
group members
The earnings from the project are calculated according to this formula
for each group member. Please note: Each group member receives the same
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earnings from the project, i.e. each group member benefits from all contri-
butions to the project.
Stage 2
Assignment of Tokens
In stage 2 it will be displayed how much each group member contributed
to the project. (Please note: Before each round a display order will ran-
domly be determined. Thus, it is not possible to identify any group member
by her position on the displayed list throughout different rounds.) By the
assignment of tokens you can reduce the payoff of a group member or keep
it unchanged.
In each round each participant receives additional 20 tokens in stage 2.
You have to decide how many from the 20 tokens you are going to assign to
other group members. The remaining tokens are kept by yourself. You can
check the costs of your token assignment by pressing the button Calculation
of Tokens.
• Each negative token that you assign to a group member reduces her
payoff by 3 tokens.
• If you assign 0 tokens to a group member her payoff won’t change.
Calculation of your payoff in stage 2
Your payoff in stage 2 consists of two components:
• tokens you kept = 20 - sum of the tokens that you have assigned to the
other group members
• less the threefold number of negative tokens you have received from
other group members
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Thus, your payoff in Stage 2 amounts to: 20 - sum of the tokens that you
assigned to other group members - 3x (the number of tokens you received
from other group members)
Calculation of your round payoff
Your round payoff is composed of Your payoff from Stage 1 20 - your
contribution to the project + 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group
members / number of group members
+ Your payoff from Stage 2 20 - sum of the tokens that you have assigned
to other group members
- 3 x (the number of tokens you have received from other group members
= Your round payoff
Special case: If it happens that you are the only member in your group
you receive 20 tokens in Stage 1 and 20 tokens in Stage 2, i.e., your round
payoff amounts to 40. You neither have to take any action on Stage 1 nor on
Stage 2. Information at the end of the round: At the end of the round you
receive a detailed overview of the results obtained in all groups. For every
group member you are informed about her: Contribution to the project,
payoff from the Stage 1, assigned tokens (if possible), received tokens (if
possible), payoff from Stage 2, round payoff.
History: Starting from the 2nd round, in the beginning of a new round
you receive an overview of the average results (as above) of all previous
rounds. Report sheet about the decisions of participants of a previously
conducted experiment Each participant receives a report sheet about the
decisions of participants of a previous experiment which was conducted in
the eLab at the University Erfurt in January 2004. In this report you will
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find average numbers of the decisions of the participants. Please read this
report before you decide. Total Payoff: The total payoff from the experiment
is composed of the starting capital of 1000 tokens plus the sum of round
payoffs from all 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment your total payoff
will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 per 100 tokens.
Please notice: Communication is not allowed during the whole exper-
iment. If you have a question please raise your hand out of the cabin. All
decisions are made anonymously, i.e., no other participant is informed about
the identity of someone who made a certain decision. The payment is anony-
mous too, i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant
is.
We wish you success!
Report sheet for the experiment
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Figure A.3: Social History
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